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Interparfums, Inc. (IPAR)

POSITIVE
Consumer DefensiveHousehold & Personal ProductsUnited States

Fundamental

83

Price

$115.89

Market Cap

$3.73B

Part 1 · What the company is worth

Overview

Interparfums, Inc. is a New York-based company, founded in 1982, that creates, markets and distributes prestige fragrances and fragrance-related products. Almost all of its brands are not its own: it signs long-term licences with fashion and luxury houses — Jimmy Choo, Coach, Montblanc, GUESS, Donna Karan/DKNY, Lacoste, Van Cleef & Arpels, Ferragamo, Abercrombie & Fitch and others — and turns those names into perfumes, which it sells in more than 120 countries. It also owns outright a handful of brands (Rochas, Lanvin, Off-White, Goutal and the proprietary Solférino line). The company owns no factories: it acts as a general contractor, buying juice, bottles and packaging from suppliers and having third-party fillers assemble the finished product, which then ships from its distribution centres. It is run through two arms — a Paris-based, 72%-owned subsidiary, Interparfums SA, itself listed on Euronext, and wholly owned US subsidiaries — under founders Jean Madar and Philippe Benacin. Net sales were $1.49 billion in fiscal 2025.

How it makes money

Revenue is the wholesale sale of finished fragrance products to department stores, perfumeries, specialty retailers and to wholesalers and distributors, in the US and abroad, including duty-free and travel retail. Revenue is booked at a single point in time, when goods ship. There is no subscription or recurring contract: each new fragrance family (a 'blockbuster' launched every few years per brand, plus more frequent 'flankers' and limited editions) has to be sold in again. The cost of the model sits on the other side: Interparfums pays the brand owners royalties on sales — $121.7 million in 2025, or 8.2% of net sales — and must commit heavy minimum advertising spend under those licences, $294.7 million of advertising and promotion in 2025. Because it owns no plants, the business is not capital intensive; its economics depend on the spread between price and the combined cost of components, royalties and marketing.

Revenue by segment

European based operations68%

Fragrances produced and distributed mainly out of France through the 72%-owned, Euronext-listed subsidiary Interparfums SA, covering brands such as Jimmy Choo, Coach, Montblanc, Lacoste, Van Cleef & Arpels, Boucheron, Kate Spade, Moncler, Karl Lagerfeld, Longchamp, Lanvin, Off-White and Solférino, sold in over 120 countries. It also includes the US distribution arm Interparfums Luxury Brands, Inc.

United States based operations32%

Fragrances produced and marketed by the wholly owned US subsidiaries under brands owned by the company or licensed from their owners — Abercrombie & Fitch, Anna Sui, Donna Karan/DKNY, Emanuel Ungaro, Ferragamo, Graff, GUESS, Hollister, MCM, Oscar de la Renta and Roberto Cavalli — sold to US retailers and distributors and exported internationally. It includes Interparfums Italia Srl in Italy.

Competitive moat

Patents and licences · Narrow

What Interparfums sells is desire attached to a name, and the names are largely rented, not owned: apart from Off-White, Lanvin, Goutal, Rochas and the proprietary Solférino line, every fragrance right comes from a licence granted by an unaffiliated third party. Those licences are long — Coach to 2031, Donna Karan/DKNY to 2032, David Beckham to 2047 — and a fashion house that has watched a partner build a global fragrance franchise has real reason to renew, which is where the advantage lies: forty years of relationships, a distribution footprint in over 120 countries, and the operational craft of turning a name into a scent that sells. But the advantage is rented, and it can be taken back. The filing states plainly that each licence has a fixed term and that losing one or more could materially hurt the company; the discontinued Dunhill licence weighed on US sales in 2025. That is why the moat is narrow rather than wide.

What drives demand

Moderately cyclical

Prestige fragrance sits in between: it is a discretionary purchase, but a small-ticket one — a bottle of perfume is the cheapest way to buy into a luxury name, which is why the category tends to hold up better than handbags or watches when budgets tighten. The company's own filing puts the sensitivity plainly: consumer spending on beauty products is influenced by general economic conditions and the availability of discretionary income, and downturns can bring sustained periods of declining sales and less traffic in its retailers' stores. Demand is also driven by things only loosely tied to the cycle — the launch calendar (a new blockbuster fragrance family every few years per brand, flankers in between), the heat of the underlying fashion brand, travel retail and duty-free volumes, and the health of department-store channels. Shipments are seasonal, weighted to the second half of the year, so quarters do not read straight across.

Key risks

  • Dependence on the renewal of licences — The company states that all its prestige fragrance rights, other than Off-White, Lanvin, Goutal and Rochas, derive from licences or agreements with unaffiliated third parties. Each has a fixed term, sometimes with optional extensions, and the business depends on renewing them on favourable terms. The loss of one or more licences could have a material adverse effect.
  • Success depends on public taste — Revenues depend substantially on the success of individual products, which turns on pronounced and rapidly changing public tastes — factors the company describes as difficult to predict and over which it has little if any control. It must also design effective marketing and promotional programmes for each launch.
  • Extreme competition in the fragrance industry — The market is described as highly competitive and sensitive to changing preferences, with competition on pricing, marketing, advertising, promotion, e-commerce expansion, technology such as AI, and above all consumer brand recognition. The company notes that many competitors are larger and have greater resources.
  • Discretionary spending and economic downturn — The company believes consumer spending on beauty products is influenced by general economic conditions and the availability of discretionary income, and that it may experience sustained periods of declining sales during downturns, including reduced traffic in its retail customers' stores.
  • Reliance on third-party manufacturers and distributors — The company owns no manufacturing facilities and relies on outside fillers and component suppliers; failure to deliver compliant, quality goods on time could materially hurt the business. It also sells a substantial percentage of its fragrances through independent luxury-goods distributors over which it has little or no control.
  • Currency and international trade — A substantial portion of net sales and net income is generated outside the United States, and over 50% of European-based operations' net sales are made in US dollars, exposing results to exchange-rate swings despite a hedging programme. The company also flags tariffs and trade restrictions, noting a global 15% tariff instituted after a Supreme Court decision voided earlier announced tariffs, which could raise the cost of goods sold into the US or compress margins.
  • Dependence on two founders — Jean Madar, Chairman and CEO, and Philippe Benacin, President and CEO of Interparfums SA, are responsible for day-to-day operations as well as major decisions. Termination of their relationships with the company, through death, incapacity or otherwise, could have a material adverse effect on operations, and the company cannot assure that qualified replacements would be found.
  • Material weakness in internal control over financial reporting — Material weaknesses identified for fiscal 2024 covered risk assessment, monitoring of controls, documentation of control effectiveness and IT general controls. Management concluded that the control-environment and IT weaknesses were remediated as of 31 December 2025, but a material weakness in the design and implementation of the risk assessment process remained at that date, and the company cannot be certain it will be remediated.
  • Counterfeiting and grey-market diversion — Third parties may illegally distribute and sell counterfeit versions of the company's products, which may be inferior or pose safety risks, and may divert authentic products through unauthorised channels — with adverse effects on revenue and on the reputation of the brands.
  • Impairment of trademarks and licences — Intangible assets including trademarks and licences are reviewed for impairment annually in the fourth quarter, or sooner if events indicate the carrying value may not be recoverable; a write-down would require a significant non-cash charge to earnings. Impairment charges of $9.2 million were recorded on the Rochas Fashion trademark in 2021 and 2022.

Customer concentration

Top customers account for 10% of revenue

Macy's, described as the company's top retail customer, accounted for approximately 10% of net sales in 2025, down from 12% in 2024; no single customer reached 10% in 2023. No other customer is disclosed as reaching the 10% threshold, so the rest of the base is spread across department stores, perfumeries, specialty retailers and wholesalers and distributors worldwide, and the company states it does not believe it is significantly exposed to undue concentration of credit risk. Geographically, the United States accounted for roughly $532.4 million of net sales in 2025 and France roughly $72.9 million, with no other country above 10%. Concentration is more visible on the brand side than the customer side: the seven largest brands were 77% of 2025 sales, led by Jimmy Choo at 17%, Coach at 15% and Montblanc at 15%.

The case for

Buyers argue that this is an asset-light way to own a slice of luxury: no factories, low capital intensity, and a portfolio of prestige names — Jimmy Choo, Coach, Montblanc, Van Cleef & Arpels, Lacoste — that the company has spent decades learning how to turn into fragrances that sell in over 120 countries. They point to licences that run long (Coach to 2031, Donna Karan/DKNY to 2032, David Beckham to 2047), which they read as fashion houses choosing to stay rather than build fragrance operations of their own. They note that the company keeps adding brands and, increasingly, buying them outright — Goutal's intellectual property was acquired in March 2025, with commercial use starting January 2026 — and launching proprietary lines such as Solférino, which shifts the mix away from rented names. They see the European arm, 68% of 2025 sales and growing 7% for the year, as the engine, with the US side held back mainly by a discontinued Dunhill licence rather than by weak demand. Founder-led management with four decades in the business, and 2025 net sales at a record $1.49 billion with income from operations of $270.3 million, are read as evidence the model compounds.

The case against

Sellers fear that the company does not own what it sells. Nearly every brand is licensed from someone else, each licence has an expiry date, and the filing itself warns that losing one or more could materially hurt the business — the discontinued Dunhill licence already weighed on US sales in 2025. They note the price of keeping those names: $121.7 million of royalties in 2025, 8.2% of net sales and rising with brand mix, plus $294.7 million of advertising and promotion largely committed under licence minimums, so a soft launch cannot be met by simply spending less. They worry about the concentration underneath the diversification — seven brands were 77% of 2025 sales, and Jimmy Choo, Coach and Montblanc alone were 47% — and about a fashion partner deciding, at renewal, to take the fragrance in-house or to a bigger bidder. They point to sales growth of about 2% in 2025 against 68% of revenue earned in Europe with over half of European sales invoiced in dollars, leaving results exposed to the currency and to the tariff regime the company flags. They also note that a material weakness in the design of the risk assessment process was still unremediated at 31 December 2025, and that day-to-day control rests with two founders whose departure the company says could materially hurt operations.

Generated on August 23, 2026 with claude-opus-5 — shared with all users

Direct competitors

Who this company fights with for the same customers

Generated on August 23, 2026 with claude-opus-5 — shared with all users

Coty Inc.COTY

Coty runs the same business model — prestige fragrances made under licence for fashion and luxury houses such as Gucci, Burberry, Hugo Boss and Calvin Klein — and the two bid against each other for the same brand licences, as when Inter Parfums took over the David Beckham and Nautica names from Coty.

Puig Brands, S.A.PUIG

Puig sells designer fragrances (Rabanne, Jean Paul Gaultier, Carolina Herrera, Penhaligon's) through the same perfumery and department-store shelves, competing for the same prestige fragrance shopper as Jimmy Choo, Coach or Montblanc.

L'Oréal S.A.OR

L'Oréal's Luxe division builds its fragrance business on licensed designer names (Yves Saint Laurent, Armani, Prada, Ralph Lauren) and is, with Coty, one of the few groups still competing for the couture and fashion licences Inter Parfums depends on.

The Estée Lauder Companies Inc.EL

Estée Lauder's fragrance portfolio (Tom Ford, Jo Malone London, Le Labo, Kilian) competes for the same prestige perfume customer and the same limited shelf space in Sephora, Ulta and travel retail.

Shiseido Company, Limited4911

Shiseido's fragrance arm lives on the same kind of designer licences — Issey Miyake, Narciso Rodriguez, Zadig & Voltaire, Tory Burch — and sells them in the same European and travel-retail channels where Inter Parfums earns most of its revenue.

Balance Sheet & Liquidity

Revenue

$1.50B

Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)

Net Income

$168M

Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)

Free Cash Flow

$190M

Total Equity

$881M

Total Liabilities

$481M

Current Ratio

3.31

Interest Coverage

38.07

Debt/EBITDA

0.55

Earnings Per Share

Revenue & Net Income

Free Cash Flow

Income Breakdown

Historical statement

Margins over time

Debt over time

How heavy the debt is

Growth grid

Growth — Revenue

Fair Value Estimation

General caseUndervalued

Fair Value

$159.50

Current Price

$115.89

Margin of Safety

+27.3%

Fair Value Range

$103.67 - $215.32

Estimation Methods

Analyst price target:$126.67
Discounted cash flow (DCF):$235.08
Earnings multiple (P/E):$124.65
Graham growth formula:$269.76
Earnings power value (EPV):$58.33
Justified P/B:$59.77
Dividend discount (Gordon):$47.83
P/FFO, funds from operations:Not enough data to compute it
Mid-cycle earnings:$118.23
Revenue multiple:Not enough data to compute it
Analyst Consensus:Strong Buy (11B / 2H / 0S)
Last Earnings Surprise:-3.32%

Valuation Metrics

P/E Ratio

22.33

ROE

19.1%

P/B Ratio

4.30

P/FCF

15.21

Gross Margin

63.8%

ROIC

17.0%

Profitability Radar

Value Creation (Economic Moat)

ROIC

17.0%

WACC

10.7%

ROIC − WACC

+6.4 pp

ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.

Fundamental Analysis Criteria

Passed (23)

  • EPS shows upward trend
  • EPS CAGR 13.01%
  • Price CAGR 13.44%
  • ROIC 17.0%
  • Gross Margin 63.8%
  • P/FCF 15.21
  • Debt/Equity ratio
  • Operating Margin 17.3%
  • Positive Free Cash Flow
  • CapEx intensity
  • Current Ratio
  • Interest Coverage
  • Debt/EBITDA
  • Return on Tangible Assets
  • ROE 19.1%
  • Revenue Growth 5Y 22.5%
  • Analyst Consensus 85% Buy
  • Earnings Surprise avg 6.0%
  • PEG Ratio 0.66
  • Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.53
  • Share Dilution 0.1%
  • Net Margin Trend 11.2% vs 11.0%
  • Piotroski F-Score 6/9

Failed (4)

  • P/B Ratio 4.30
  • Low reliance on intangibles
  • Price below Graham Number
  • DCF valuation (Overvalued)

Unavailable (1)

  • Dividend Payout NaN%

Piotroski F-Score

6/9

Mixed signals: some areas need attention

score
criteria

Earnings Quality

1.53

High quality: earnings backed by cash

Share Dilution

0.1%

Share count is stable

Governance

Executive Team

NameTitleAge
Mr. Jean MadarCo-Founder, Chairman & CEO64
Mr. Philippe BenacinCo-Founder, Vice Chairman & President66
Mr. Michel AtwoodCFO & Director54
Mr. Herve BouillonnecChief Commercial Officer & Director54
Mr. Frederic Garcia-PelayoExecutive VP & COO of Interparfums SA65
Ms. Michelle HabertController-
Amanda SeelingerSecretary-

Audit Risk

10

Board Risk

10

Compensation Risk

9

Shareholder Rights Risk

4

Part 2 · The price and when to enter

This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.

Latest News

Recent headlines for IPAR, sourced from Markets Gazette.

  • 2/25/2026NEUTRAL
    Inter Parfums (IPAR) Q4 2025 Earnings Transcript

    Inter Parfums (IPAR) investors are awaiting the release of the Q4 2025 earnings transcript, scheduled for February 25, 2026. Currently, specific details regarding the financial results are not available. Market attention is focused on how the company, known for manufacturing and distributing luxury fragrances, performed in the final quarter of the fiscal year. The transcript will provide clarity on revenues, margins, and future outlook, which are crucial elements for evaluating the stock's trajectory. Without concrete data, sentiment remains in limbo, with analysts monitoring for any indications of growth or operational challenges.

via Markets Gazette