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KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP (KMB)

NEUTRAL
Consumer DefensiveHousehold & Personal ProductsUnited States

Fundamental

56

Kurs

$110.85

Marktkapitalisierung

$37.04B

Teil 1 · Was das Unternehmen wert ist

Übersicht

Kimberly-Clark makes disposable personal-care and tissue products — diapers (Huggies), feminine and adult care, paper towels and toilet paper (Kleenex, Scott) — sold mainly through supermarkets, mass retailers and pharmacies. Its North America business is the larger and more profitable half; a separate International Personal Care unit sells largely the same categories outside the US and Canada. It is also folding in Kenvue (Tylenol, Band-Aid, Listerine) through a pending acquisition, and moving its non-US tissue business into a joint venture with Brazil's Suzano.

Wie das Geld verdient wird

Kimberly-Clark sells everyday disposable products that customers repurchase every few weeks, so revenue depends on volume and price/mix rather than one-time big-ticket sales. It negotiates directly with a small number of very large retailers — Walmart alone is about 16% of net sales — who control shelf space and can push back hard on price increases, especially when store-brand alternatives sit right next to Kimberly-Clark's products. Profitability rises and falls largely with the cost of pulp, resin and other raw materials relative to what retailers accept in price increases.

Umsatz nach Segment

North America65.85%

Personal care and tissue brands sold in the US and Canada, Kimberly-Clark's largest and most profitable market.

International Personal Care34.15%

Diapers, feminine and adult care products sold outside North America, largely in emerging markets.

Wettbewerbsvorteil

Marke · Schmal

Huggies, Kleenex and Scott are recognized household names that let Kimberly-Clark charge more than unbranded alternatives and secure shelf space with retailers. But private-label products sit right next to them at lower prices in every category it competes in, and large retailers hold real bargaining power over listing and price, so the brand premium is real but limited rather than dominant.

Was die Nachfrage antreibt

Defensiv

Diapers, tissue and paper towels are bought regardless of the economic cycle, since consumers rarely cut back on basic hygiene products even in a downturn, which keeps volumes fairly stable. The bigger swing factor is the input-cost cycle — pulp, resin and energy prices — and retailers' willingness to accept the price increases needed to offset it, not end-consumer demand itself.

Wichtigste Risiken

  • Retailer bargaining power — A handful of very large retailers, led by Walmart, control the shelf space Kimberly-Clark depends on and can resist price increases or favor private-label alternatives.
  • Raw material cost volatility — Prices for pulp, resin, energy and other key inputs can rise sharply, and Kimberly-Clark may not be able to fully offset them through pricing without hurting volume.
  • Kenvue acquisition integration — The pending Kenvue acquisition will substantially increase debt and carries execution risk; the deal could also be delayed, face regulatory obstacles, or fail to deliver the expected synergies.
  • Private-label competition — Store-brand competitors, some with significantly lower development and manufacturing costs, offer comparable products at lower prices in nearly every category Kimberly-Clark serves.

Kundenkonzentration

Die größten Kunden machen 16 % des Umsatzes aus

Walmart alone accounted for approximately 16% of net sales from continuing operations in 2025, concentrated mostly in the North America segment; losing shelf space or favorable terms with a retailer this size would be difficult to replace elsewhere.

Die Argumente dafür

Buyers argue that Kleenex, Huggies and Scott are habitual purchases that hold their shelf position through economic cycles, that adding Kenvue's health-care brands diversifies the business beyond paper and diaper categories, and that shedding the lower-margin international tissue business into the Suzano joint venture should lift overall margins.

Die Argumente dagegen

Sellers worry that the Kenvue deal loads the balance sheet with new debt right as Kimberly-Clark still has to prove the acquisition's synergies, that a handful of retailers led by Walmart can squeeze pricing whenever input costs rise, and that private-label alternatives keep gaining share in categories where the brand premium is hardest to defend.

Written by the editors, published on 18. August 2026

Direct competitors

Who this company fights with for the same customers

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Bilanz & Liquidität

Umsatz

$16.58B

Letzte 12 Monate (bis 30.6.2026)

Nettogewinn

$1.96B

Letzte 12 Monate (bis 30.6.2026)

Freier Cashflow

$1.64B

Gesamtes Eigenkapital

$1.50B

Gesamtverbindlichkeiten

$15.47B

Current Ratio

0.91

Zinsdeckungsgrad

9.18

Schulden/EBITDA

2.06

Gewinn je Aktie

Umsatz & Nettogewinn

Freier Cashflow

Ertragsaufschlüsselung

Historische Aufstellung

Margen im Zeitverlauf

Verschuldung im Zeitverlauf

Wie schwer die Schulden wiegen

Wachstumsraster

Wachstum — Umsatz

Innerer-Wert-Schätzung

Fair bewertet

Innerer Wert

$105.17

Aktueller Kurs

$110.85

Sicherheitsmarge

-5.4%

Innerer-Wert-Spanne

$69.32 - $141.03

Bewertungsmethoden

Analyst Target:$118.60
DCF:$151.08
PE-based:$74.03
Graham Growth:$37.85
EPV:$74.48
Analystenkonsens:Kaufen (9B / 11H / 1S)
Letzte Gewinnüberraschung:+4.20%

Bewertungskennzahlen

P/E-Verhältnis

18.94

ROE

134.6%

P/B-Verhältnis

21.17

P/FCF

20.35

Bruttomarge

36.8%

ROIC

18.6%

Rentabilitäts-Radar

Value Creation (Economic Moat)

ROIC

18.6%

WACC

7.3%

ROIC − WACC

+11.4 pp

ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.

Fundamentalanalyse-Kriterien

Bestanden (15)

  • EPS shows upward trend
  • ROIC 18.6%
  • Gross Margin 36.8%
  • P/FCF 20.35
  • Operating Margin 14.3%
  • Positive Free Cash Flow
  • Current Ratio
  • Interest Coverage
  • Debt/EBITDA
  • Return on Tangible Assets
  • ROE 122.6%
  • Earnings Surprise avg 2.9%
  • Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.70
  • Share Dilution -1.2%
  • Piotroski F-Score 5/9

Nicht bestanden (11)

  • EPS CAGR 2.23%
  • Price CAGR -0.43%
  • P/B Ratio 21.17
  • Debt/Equity ratio
  • CapEx intensity
  • Low reliance on intangibles
  • Price below Graham Number
  • DCF valuation (Fairly valued)
  • Revenue Growth 5Y -3.0%
  • Analyst Consensus 43% Buy
  • Net Margin Trend 11.8% vs 14.8%

Nicht verfügbar (2)

  • Dividend Payout NaN%
  • PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)

Piotroski F-Score

5/9

Gemischte Signale: Einige Bereiche bedürfen Aufmerksamkeit

score
criteria

Gewinnqualität

1.70

Hohe Qualität: Gewinne durch Cashflow gedeckt

Aktienverwässerung

-1.2%

Aktienrückkäufe. Aktionärsfreundlich

Unternehmensführung

Führungsteam

NamePositionAlter
Mr. Michael D. HsuChairman & CEO61
Mr. Russell C. TorresPresident & COO53
Mr. Nelson UrdanetaSenior VP, CFO & Interim Principal Accounting Officer,53
Mr. Jeffrey P. Melucci J.D.Chief Strategy, Business Development & Administrative Officer54
Mr. Francesco TintoChief Information & Global Business Services Officer-
Mr. Christopher M. Jakubik C.F.A.Investor Relations Contact-
Mr. Grant B. McGee J.D.General Counsel44
Ms. Preeti BinoyHead Corporate Communications & Government Affairs - India-
Ms. Stacey J. Valy PanayiotouChief Human Resources Officer52
Mr. Ehab Abou-OafChief Executive Officer of Arbex58

Prüfungsrisiko

3

Vorstandsrisiko

5

Vergütungsrisiko

6

Aktionärsrechterisiko

4

Teil 2 · Der Preis und der Einstiegszeitpunkt

Dieser Teil sagt nicht, ob das Unternehmen etwas taugt: Er hilft bei der Wahl des Kaufzeitpunkts, nachdem die Fundamentaldaten überzeugt haben. Enthalten: technische Analyse, Potenzial, historische Drawdowns, Gamma-Exposure.

Latest News

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