Alkermes plc (ALKS)

Comment l'entreprise gagne de l'argent

Money arrives along two very different paths. The first is selling its own medicines in the United States: Alkermes sells ARISTADA, ARISTADA INITIO, LYBALVI and VIVITROL to pharmaceutical wholesalers, specialty distributors and pharmacies, and books the sale when the customer takes delivery. What it books is net of heavy deductions — Medicaid rebates, other payer rebates, chargebacks and co-pay assistance — because a large part of this patient population is covered by public programmes; in 2025 actual Medicaid rebates came in $26.7 million lower than estimated for VIVITROL and $13.6 million lower for ARISTADA/ARISTADA INITIO, which flattered reported net sales. In 2025 these own-product sales were $1,184.6 million, roughly four-fifths of the total. The second path is manufacturing and royalty revenue from partners: a tiered know-how royalty from Janssen (Johnson & Johnson) on the long-acting INVEGA products, a 15% royalty from Biogen on worldwide VUMERITY sales, and manufacturing fees plus a 2.5% royalty from Janssen on RISPERDAL CONSTA. That second path totalled $291.3 million in 2025, down sharply from $474.1 million in 2024 because the US royalty on INVEGA SUSTENNA expired in August 2024. This is the key thing to understand about the model: the partner royalties are contractual streams with expiry dates written into them — INVEGA TRINZA and INVEGA HAFYERA royalties run only to 2030 — so they shrink on a known schedule and cannot be grown.

Chiffre d'affaires par segment

The advantage rests on patents and on formulation know-how that is hard to copy, but it has a visible expiry calendar, which is why it reads as narrow rather than wide. On the strong side, ARISTADA and ARISTADA INITIO are protected in the US until 2039 and LYBALVI until 2041, and the filing says no generic versions of the ARISTADA family are expected in the near term. The proprietary platforms — microsphere injections, LINKERX linker chemistry, NANOCRYSTAL — plus a single specialised plant in Wilmington, Ohio that has passed inspection by US, European, Chinese, Japanese, Brazilian, Turkish, Russian and Saudi regulators are genuinely difficult to reproduce, and the Janssen relationship shows their value: the know-how royalty on INVEGA survived even after the patent royalty expired, because Janssen still owed for the technology transfer. On the weak side, the protection is finite and running out unevenly. The last VIVITROL patent expires in 2029, but under settlements with Teva and Amneal generics may enter from 15 January 2027 — and VIVITROL is still the single largest product. Nothing about the platforms stops a competitor from developing a different long-acting antipsychotic: the filing lists a long roster of rivals in both addiction and schizophrenia. LYBALVI is already in Paragraph IV litigation over patents expiring between 2032 and 2041.

Demand for these medicines has very little to do with the economic cycle. Schizophrenia affects roughly 1.1% of the US population and bipolar I disorder about 1% of US adults in any given year; the 2024 US National Survey on Drug Use and Health counted an estimated 4.6 million American adults with an opioid use disorder and 27.1 million with an alcohol use disorder. These are chronic conditions that need treating in a recession as much as in a boom, and a large share of the patients are covered by Medicaid rather than paying out of pocket, which further insulates volumes from household budgets. What actually moves Alkermes' revenue is a different clock: the product life cycle. LYBALVI grew because units sold rose 19% in 2025 as the launch matured; VIVITROL and ARISTADA units actually fell 3% and 2% respectively and were carried by a 3% January price increase; and the royalty line collapsed by $182.8 million because a contract expired, not because patients stopped needing the drug. A beginner should therefore read the cyclicality question here as being about patents, launches and reimbursement decisions, not about GDP. One genuine external driver is public health policy: VIVITROL's market is shaped by how US federal and state programmes choose to fund treatment for addiction.

Principaux risques

• Revenue is concentrated in a handful of proprietary products — The company states that sales of its proprietary products make up a significant portion of revenues, and that its success depends in large part on continuing to manufacture and commercialise VIVITROL, ARISTADA, ARISTADA INITIO, LYBALVI and LUMRYZ successfully. Any significant negative development affecting these products could materially harm revenues, results and the share price.
• Patents may be challenged and generics may enter — Alkermes discloses that patent and other intellectual property protection is key to its competitive position but is uncertain, and that it and its licensees have faced and may face claims against those rights and competition from generic manufacturers. The filing gives concrete examples: Argentum requested a reexamination of the VIVITROL patent in December 2024 and Apotex petitioned for an inter partes review in January 2025 (both resolved in the company's favour during 2025), a Paragraph IV suit against Teva led to a settlement allowing a generic VIVITROL from 15 January 2027, and LYBALVI is currently in Paragraph IV litigation.
• Reimbursement and payer pressure — The company discloses that revenues depend in part on third-party payers making reimbursement available, on the extent of patient cost-sharing (co-payments, co-insurance, deductibles) and on cost-control measures imposed by payers. Any reduction in payment rates or reimbursement, or any increase in what the company or patients must pay back to payers, could cut both sales and revenues.
• Dependence on a single manufacturing plant — Alkermes relies solely on its Wilmington, Ohio facility to manufacture ARISTADA, ARISTADA INITIO, LYBALVI, RISPERDAL CONSTA and VIVITROL. Because of regulatory and technical requirements it has limited ability to shift production within the plant or to outsource it if manufacturing is interrupted or demand exceeds capacity; transferring processes to a third party would take significant time and resources, might fail, and could cause a serious interruption in supply.
• Reliance on licensees for a large slice of revenue — The company depends on its licensees to commercialise and continue developing the products from which it draws royalty and manufacturing revenue. If those licensees are not effective, or if disputes arise over the contracts, revenues could be materially harmed. The history with Janssen illustrates the point: after Janssen partially terminated the INVEGA licence in November 2021 and stopped paying US royalties, Alkermes had to go through binding arbitration, which in May 2023 reinstated the royalties and ordered back payment.
• Integration of the Avadel acquisition may disappoint — Alkermes discloses that it may fail to realise some or all of the anticipated benefits and synergies of the Avadel Acquisition, or to integrate Avadel's business successfully, which could adversely affect its business, its financial condition and the price of its ordinary shares. The deal closed on 12 February 2026 at $21.00 per Avadel share in cash plus a contingent value right of up to $1.50 tied to a milestone.
• Clinical trials are expensive and their outcome is uncertain — The company states that clinical trials for its product candidates are expensive, may take several years to complete, and have uncertain outcomes; that preliminary, topline or interim data it announces may change as more patient data arrive and may not match final results or real-world use; and that it may not succeed in expanding its R&D pipeline or its commercial portfolio, which could limit its growth potential.
• Irish incorporation and US tax treatment — Alkermes discloses that the US Internal Revenue Service may disagree with its conclusion that it should be treated as a foreign corporation for US federal income tax purposes. It also flags that if the separation of its oncology business, completed in November 2023, ultimately fails to qualify as a transaction that is generally tax-free for US federal and Irish tax purposes, the company and its shareholders could face significant tax liabilities.

Les principaux clients représentent 68% du chiffre d'affaires

Concentration is high, and it is worth understanding what it does and does not mean. In 2025 three customers each exceeded 10% of total revenue: McKesson at 31%, Cencora at 20% and Cardinal Health at 17% — together 68%. These are not the people who take the medicine; they are the three big US pharmaceutical wholesalers that buy the product and move it on to pharmacies and treatment providers. The end demand behind them is spread across many prescribers and thousands of patients. The company still flags the exposure as a risk in its own words: it relies heavily on these three wholesalers to distribute ARISTADA, ARISTADA INITIO, LYBALVI and VIVITROL, and says that losing a relationship, a prolonged business disruption at one of them, or a shift in their buying patterns could materially hurt results. The same three names dominate receivables — 33%, 26% and 17% at the end of 2025 — so a payment failure would matter too. A fourth relationship, Janssen, has faded from the picture: it supplied 31% of consolidated revenue in 2023 and 17% in 2024, but fell below the 10% disclosure threshold in 2025 after the INVEGA SUSTENNA royalty expired. Biogen accounted for about 9% of consolidated revenues in 2025.