KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP (KMB)
NEUTRALFondamental
56
Prix
$110.85
Capitalisation boursière
$37.04B
Partie 1 · Ce que vaut l'entreprise
Vue d'ensemble
Kimberly-Clark makes disposable personal-care and tissue products — diapers (Huggies), feminine and adult care, paper towels and toilet paper (Kleenex, Scott) — sold mainly through supermarkets, mass retailers and pharmacies. Its North America business is the larger and more profitable half; a separate International Personal Care unit sells largely the same categories outside the US and Canada. It is also folding in Kenvue (Tylenol, Band-Aid, Listerine) through a pending acquisition, and moving its non-US tissue business into a joint venture with Brazil's Suzano.
Comment l'entreprise gagne de l'argent
Kimberly-Clark sells everyday disposable products that customers repurchase every few weeks, so revenue depends on volume and price/mix rather than one-time big-ticket sales. It negotiates directly with a small number of very large retailers — Walmart alone is about 16% of net sales — who control shelf space and can push back hard on price increases, especially when store-brand alternatives sit right next to Kimberly-Clark's products. Profitability rises and falls largely with the cost of pulp, resin and other raw materials relative to what retailers accept in price increases.
Chiffre d'affaires par segment
Personal care and tissue brands sold in the US and Canada, Kimberly-Clark's largest and most profitable market.
Diapers, feminine and adult care products sold outside North America, largely in emerging markets.
Avantage concurrentiel
Marque · ÉtroitHuggies, Kleenex and Scott are recognized household names that let Kimberly-Clark charge more than unbranded alternatives and secure shelf space with retailers. But private-label products sit right next to them at lower prices in every category it competes in, and large retailers hold real bargaining power over listing and price, so the brand premium is real but limited rather than dominant.
Ce qui stimule la demande
DéfensifDiapers, tissue and paper towels are bought regardless of the economic cycle, since consumers rarely cut back on basic hygiene products even in a downturn, which keeps volumes fairly stable. The bigger swing factor is the input-cost cycle — pulp, resin and energy prices — and retailers' willingness to accept the price increases needed to offset it, not end-consumer demand itself.
Principaux risques
- Retailer bargaining power — A handful of very large retailers, led by Walmart, control the shelf space Kimberly-Clark depends on and can resist price increases or favor private-label alternatives.
- Raw material cost volatility — Prices for pulp, resin, energy and other key inputs can rise sharply, and Kimberly-Clark may not be able to fully offset them through pricing without hurting volume.
- Kenvue acquisition integration — The pending Kenvue acquisition will substantially increase debt and carries execution risk; the deal could also be delayed, face regulatory obstacles, or fail to deliver the expected synergies.
- Private-label competition — Store-brand competitors, some with significantly lower development and manufacturing costs, offer comparable products at lower prices in nearly every category Kimberly-Clark serves.
Concentration des clients
Les principaux clients représentent 16% du chiffre d'affaires
Walmart alone accounted for approximately 16% of net sales from continuing operations in 2025, concentrated mostly in the North America segment; losing shelf space or favorable terms with a retailer this size would be difficult to replace elsewhere.
Les arguments en faveur
Buyers argue that Kleenex, Huggies and Scott are habitual purchases that hold their shelf position through economic cycles, that adding Kenvue's health-care brands diversifies the business beyond paper and diaper categories, and that shedding the lower-margin international tissue business into the Suzano joint venture should lift overall margins.
Les arguments contre
Sellers worry that the Kenvue deal loads the balance sheet with new debt right as Kimberly-Clark still has to prove the acquisition's synergies, that a handful of retailers led by Walmart can squeeze pricing whenever input costs rise, and that private-label alternatives keep gaining share in categories where the brand premium is hardest to defend.
Written by the editors, published on 18 août 2026
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
No editorial profile for this company yet
No competitor list for this company yet.
Bilan & Liquidités
Chiffre d'affaires
$16.58B
12 derniers mois (au 30/06/2026)
Résultat net
$1.96B
12 derniers mois (au 30/06/2026)
Flux de trésorerie libre
$1.64B
Capitaux propres totaux
$1.50B
Passif total
$15.47B
Ratio de liquidité général
0.91
Couverture des intérêts
9.18
Dette/EBITDA
2.06
Bénéfice par action
Chiffre d'affaires & Résultat net
Flux de trésorerie libre
Décomposition du résultat
État historique
Marges dans le temps
La dette dans le temps
Le poids de la dette
Grille de la croissance
Croissance — Chiffre d'affaires
Estimation de la juste valeur
Juste valeur
$105.17
Prix actuel
$110.85
Marge de sécurité
-5.4%
Fourchette de juste valeur
$69.32 - $141.03
Méthodes d'estimation
Indicateurs de valorisation
Ratio P/E
18.94
ROE
134.6%
Ratio P/B
21.17
P/FCF
20.35
Marge brute
36.8%
ROIC
18.6%
Radar de rentabilité
Value Creation (Economic Moat)
ROIC
18.6%
WACC
7.3%
ROIC − WACC
+11.4 pp
ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.
Critères d'analyse fondamentale
Réussi (15)
- EPS shows upward trend
- ROIC 18.6%
- Gross Margin 36.8%
- P/FCF 20.35
- Operating Margin 14.3%
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- Current Ratio
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
- Return on Tangible Assets
- ROE 122.6%
- Earnings Surprise avg 2.9%
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.70
- Share Dilution -1.2%
- Piotroski F-Score 5/9
Échoué (11)
- EPS CAGR 2.23%
- Price CAGR -0.43%
- P/B Ratio 21.17
- Debt/Equity ratio
- CapEx intensity
- Low reliance on intangibles
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Fairly valued)
- Revenue Growth 5Y -3.0%
- Analyst Consensus 43% Buy
- Net Margin Trend 11.8% vs 14.8%
Indisponible (2)
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)
Score F de Piotroski
Signaux mixtes : certains domaines nécessitent attention
Qualité des bénéfices
Qualité élevée : bénéfices soutenus par la trésorerie
Dilution du capital
Rachat d'actions. Favorable aux actionnaires
Gouvernance
Équipe dirigeante
| Nom | Titre | Âge |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Michael D. Hsu | Chairman & CEO | 61 |
| Mr. Russell C. Torres | President & COO | 53 |
| Mr. Nelson Urdaneta | Senior VP, CFO & Interim Principal Accounting Officer, | 53 |
| Mr. Jeffrey P. Melucci J.D. | Chief Strategy, Business Development & Administrative Officer | 54 |
| Mr. Francesco Tinto | Chief Information & Global Business Services Officer | - |
| Mr. Christopher M. Jakubik C.F.A. | Investor Relations Contact | - |
| Mr. Grant B. McGee J.D. | General Counsel | 44 |
| Ms. Preeti Binoy | Head Corporate Communications & Government Affairs - India | - |
| Ms. Stacey J. Valy Panayiotou | Chief Human Resources Officer | 52 |
| Mr. Ehab Abou-Oaf | Chief Executive Officer of Arbex | 58 |
Risque d'audit
3
Risque du conseil
5
Risque de rémunération
6
Risque droits des actionnaires
4
Partie 2 · Le prix et le moment d'entrer
Cette partie ne dit pas si l'entreprise vaut la peine : elle aide à choisir quand l'acheter, une fois que les fondamentaux vous ont convaincu. À l'intérieur : analyse technique, potentiel, baisses historiques, exposition gamma.
Latest News
Recent headlines for KMB, sourced from Markets Gazette.